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Abstract Karl Menger’s 1934 paper on the St. Petersburg paradox contains mathe-
matical errors that invalidate his conclusion that unbounded utility functions, specif-
ically Bernoulli’s logarithmic utility, fail to resolve modified versions of the St. Pe-
tersburg paradox.
Keywords Menger · unbounded utility · Bernoulli · St. Petersburg paradox ·
ergodicity
1 Preview and preliminaries
In Section 2 the St. Petersburg paradox is defined. Section 3 motivates its recent
resolution using the concept of ergodicity, including Section 3.1 where the ergodicity
argument is related to a discussion in the economics literature. Section 4 contrasts this
with D. Bernoulli’s traditional 1738 resolution, and Section 5 summarizes Menger’s
1934 study, setting out its reception and conceptual significance. Section 6 focuses on
Menger’s errors, with the central result in Section 6.2 that Menger overlooked a sec-
ond divergence in the application of Bernoulli’s resolution to his modified paradox.
Section 7 investigates Menger’s game using the ergodicity resolution, and Section 8
is a brief summary of the findings of the present study.
1.1 Text and notation
Page numbers for [Menger(1934)] refer to the English translation by Schoellkopf and
Mellon from 1967 [Menger(1967)].
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2 Ole Peters
I will adopt the notation used there with the following exceptions. Whereas Menger
uses the same symbol D, and sometimes Dn for different functions of n, I use D(n)
for the general case, DA(n) for the payout function used by Bernoulli, DB(n) for that
used by Menger, and DC(n) for a milder version of Menger’s game, see Table 1. I
introduce the symbol P for the ticket price, which – significantly – does not appear in
Menger’s equations.
The printing of [Menger(1967)] contains several typographical errors, especially
on p. 217, where the intended e2
n
is repeatedly misprinted as e2n. Also on this page,
1/2n is misprinted as 12/2
n. No further relevant discrepancies with the original Ger-
man text were found.
When this is convenient, monetary units are called dollars, $, for dimensional
consistency, although the choice of unit or currency is irrelevant. I will synonymously
use the terms “expectation value” and “ensemble average”.
Page numbers for [Bernoulli(1738)] refer to the 1956 English translation by Som-
mer.
2 The St. Petersburg paradox
N. Bernoulli, in a letter to Montmort in 1713 [Montmort(1713)], introduced lotteries
of a certain type. D. Bernoulli, in a study published by the Imperial Academy of
Sciences in St. Petersburg, considered the following specific case [Bernoulli(1738)]:
a fair coin is tossed until the first heads event occurs. The number of coin tosses
necessary to arrive at this event is n, and the payout as a function of n is $DA(n) =
$2n−1. We will refer to this as game A. The expectation value of the payout in game
A is given by the divergent sum
〈DA(n)〉=
∞
∑
n=1
(
1
2
)n
2n−1 =
1
2
+
1
2
+
1
2
+ · · · . (1)
N. Bernoulli mentioned that he found this game “curious” [Montmort(1713)], p. 402.
Later researchers found it “paradoxical” that, in general, individuals offered to pur-
chase a ticket in this lottery are not willing to pay very much for it, namely no more
than a few dollars, rather than their entire fortunes or indeed all the money they can
borrow. The surprise by these early researchers reflects the belief that risky ventures
may be judged by
Criterion i:
a gamble is worth taking if the expectation value of the net change of wealth, here
〈D(n)〉−P, is positive.
This criterion fails in the St. Petersburg paradox, in the sense that there is no
finite price P at which it discourages participation. Criterion i may be attributed to
Huygens, who wrote “if any one should put 3 shillings in one hand without telling
me which, and 7 in the other, and give me choice of either of them; I say, it is the
same thing as if he should give me 5 shillings...” [Huygens(1657)]. Many resolutions
were put forward, as reviewed e.g. in Menger(1934) and Samuelson(1977).
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3 Resolution based on Ergodicity
The present comment is written in view of the connection between ergodic theory and
the paradox. The St. Petersburg paradox rests on the apparent contradicton between
a positively infinite expectation value of winnings in a game and real people’s un-
willingness to pay much to be allowed to participate in the game. Bernoulli (1738),
p. 24, pointed out that because of this incongruence, the expectation value of net
winnings, criterion i, has to be “discarded” as a descriptive or prescriptive behav-
ioral rule. One can now decide what to change about “the expectation value of net
winnings”: either “the expectation value” or the “net winnings” (or both). Bernoulli,
see Sec. 4, chose to replace the net winnings by introducing utility. An alternative
resolution, motivated by the development of the field of ergodic theory in the late
19th and throughout the 20th century, replaces the expectation value (or ensemble
average) with a time average, without introducing utility. Details of this resolution
can be found in [Peters(2011)]. Conceptually, ergodic theory deals with the question
whether expectation values, which can be thought of as averages over non-interacting
copies of a system (sometimes called parallel universes), are identical to time aver-
ages, where the dynamics of a single system are averaged along a time trajectory. It
is pointed out in [Peters(2011)] that the system under investigation, a mathematical
representation of the dynamics of wealth of an individual, is not ergodic, and that this
manifests itself as a difference between the ensemble average and the time average
of the growth rate of wealth. Historically, ergodic theory emphasizes the relevance of
the time average, which was discovered later.
To compute ensemble averages, only a probability distribution is required, whereas
time averages require a dynamic. This implies that an additional assumption enters
into the resolution in [Peters(2011)]. This assumption corresponds to the multiplica-
tive nature of wealth accumulation: any wealth gained can itself be employed to gen-
erate further wealth, which leads to exponential growth. The assumption is in general
use, where the word “general” has the same meaning as in the following statement:
in general, banks and governments offer exponentially growing interest payments on
savings. This multiplicativity leads to a logarithm entering the time-average growth
rate. Different assumptions about the dynamics can be envisioned, and these would
lead to different functions appearing in place of the logarithm. Consequences of re-
placing the logarithm with generalized versions of it, in expressions very similar to
(Eq. 2), have been a topic of intense study in recent years in statistical mechanics
[Hanel et al(2011)Hanel, Thurner, and Gell-Mann,Gell-Mann and Tsallis(2004)].
The treatment acknowledging the non-ergodicity of the system, assuming multi-
plicative dynamics, produces
Criterion ii:
a gamble is worth taking if g¯, the time-average exponential growth rate of a player’s
wealth, is positive, where
g¯ =
∞
∑
n=1
(
1
2
)n
ln
(
W −P+D(n)
W
)
. (2)
For a proof, see [Peters(2011)].
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One method of computing both ensemble and time averages is to write down
for a finite number of sample members and a finite sampling time an estimator of
the quantity of interest. One then considers two different limits: for the ensemble
average the number of samples is taken to infinity, and for the time average time is
taken to infinity. If the two limiting processes do not commute, then the ensemble
average is different from the time average, and the system is manifestly not ergodic
[Peters(2011),Peters(2010)].
The encoding by the logarithm of effects of time in an ensemble average ((Eq. 2)
is an ensemble average of the logarithm) can be understood by writing the logarithm
as a limit, ln(x) = limq→∞ q(x1/q−1). This limit corresponds, in the present context,
to the lottery being played repeatedly for an infinitely long time in appropriately
rescaled time units, see [Peters(2011)]. Thus, in (Eq. 2), which is an ensemble average
of a logarithmic growth rate (the time unit being one lottery game), the time-limit is
implicitly taken first. Since the two limits do not commute in this case, this is not an
ensemble average but a time average.
There is no mention of repetitions of the game in N. Bernoulli’s letter, but one side
of the paradox is human behavior, shaped by evolution of individuals living through
time, making decisions repeatedly in risky situations. It is reasonable to assume that
the intuition behind the human behavior is a result of making repeated decisions and
considering repeated games.
There is no doubt that in the St. Petersburg paradox the time average is more
relevant than the ensemble average: the ensemble average diverges (does not exist).
Nor does the interpretation of its divergence as “very large” yield meaningful results.
Criterion i must therefore indeed be discarded, as noted by Bernoulli. The time av-
erage assuming the simplest dynamics, on the other hand, resolves the paradox both
mathematically and behaviorally. Mathematically, there exists a finite price at which
the gamble should be rejected. Behaviorally, this finite price approximately reflects
people’s choices, as is evident from Bernoulli’s resolution based on behavioral (albeit
unsystematic) observations, Sec. 4, which for game A is similar to criterion ii.
3.1 The time argument in economics
Following [Kelly Jr.(1956)], a debate regarding the use of time averages began in
the economics literature. Kelly had computed time-average exponential growth rates
in games of chance and argued that utility was not necessary and “too general to
shed any light on the specific problems” he considered, [Kelly Jr.(1956)], p. 918. The
significance of time averages thus came very close to being fully recognized in eco-
nomics but the opportunity was missed, and the connection to ergodic theory was
not made. This is noteworthy because from the perspective of the ergodicity debate
the burden of proof is on him who uses expectation values. Whereas the conceptual
meaning of a time average is clear – resulting from a single system whose proper-
ties are averaged over time, the use of an ensemble average has to be justified, for
instance by showing (for ergodic systems) that it is identical to the time average. Al-
ternatively, an ensemble can be a good approximation if a large sample of essentially
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identical and independent copies of the relevant system really exists, as was the case
in Boltzmann’s studies [Boltzmann(1871),Cohen(1997)].
While the time argument was known [Kelly Jr.(1956),Breiman(1961),Markowitz(1976)],
its fundamental character was not recognized. For instance, it was argued to be of
limited relevance because it assumes following a system’s dynamics for an infinite
amount of time [Samuelson(1979)]. Of course, time averages are practically mean-
ingful only if the real system has time to explore the relevant part of its dynamical
range. But the point of view of ergodic theory emphasizes the opposite line of argu-
ment. To put it provocatively, the ensemble average assumes an infinite number of
parallel universes. While real time scales are not infinite, they can be large, whereas
the real sample consists of exactly one system (reality) and cannot be enlarged be-
cause that would imply the absurdity of creating other universes, or – more mildly –
copies of the system.
Due to undetected errors and inaccuracies in [Menger(1934)] it is commonly
stated in the economics literature that Menger proved criterion ii to be invalid, see
below. Because it was not known that criterion ii follows from considerations of er-
godicity, and that Menger’s conclusions are at odds with a well-developed mathemat-
ical field, his study was not subjected to sufficient scrutiny, as will become apparent
in Section 6.
4 Bernoulli’s 1738 resolution
D. Bernoulli, writing about two centuries before the formulation of the ergodic hy-
pothesis, offered the following behavioral resolution of the paradox: Since people
care about their monetary wealth only insofar as it is useful to them, he introduced
the utility function U(W ) that assigns to any wealth $W a usefulness. Specifically,
Bernoulli considered the function UB(W )= ln(W ). The quantity, Bernoulli suggested,
that people consider when deciding whether to take part in the lottery is a combina-
tion of the expected gain in their utility and the loss in utility they suffer when they
purchase a ticket. This leads to Bernoulli’s
Criterion iii:
a gamble is worth taking if the following quantity is positive [Bernoulli(1738)],
pp. 26–27:
〈
∆U+B
〉−∆U−B = ∞∑
n=1
(
1
2
)n
ln
(
W +2n−1
W
)
− ln
(
W
W −P
)
. (3)
The first terms on either side of the equation represent the expected gain in logarith-
mic utility, resulting from the payouts of the lottery. This would be the net change
in utility if tickets were given away for free. The second terms represent the loss in
logarithmic utility suffered at the time of purchase, i.e. after the ticket is bought but
before any payout from the lottery is received. Notice that Bernoulli did not calculate
the expected net change in logarithmic utility, which would be
〈∆UB〉=
∞
∑
n=1
(
1
2
)n
ln
(
W +2n−1−P
W
)
. (4)
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This expression, (Eq. 4), is mathematically identical to the time-average growth rate,
(Eq. 2). The expected net change in logarithmic utility thus encodes in an ensemble
average information about time under multiplicative dynamics.
Bernoulli justifies his criterion iii as follows: “in a fair game the disutility to be
suffered by losing must be equal to the utility to be derived by winning”, [Bernoulli(1738)],
p. 27. If this leads us to believe that Bernoulli wanted to define a fair game as one
where the expected net change in utility is zero, then we will conclude that he made
an error in mathematizing this through (Eq. 3). Bernoulli did not explicitly claim to
compute the expected net change in utility. Be it by mistake or deliberately, he stated
the belief that people tend to act according to criterion iii, (Eq. 3). This criterion
states that, irrespective of future gains, one would never give away one’s entire for-
tune for a ticket in any game, as this would correspond to an infinite loss in utility at
the time of purchase. This could be interpreted as a feeling of distrust. What if the
lottery is a scam? It can lead to nonsensical results if a future gain greater than the
player’s wealth is certain, see Section 6.1. The fact that we are forced to make choices
of interpretation is characteristic of the lack of clarity in the debate from the outset.
Any statement that is fundamentally behavioral and seems incorrect to us can be in-
terpreted either as a mistake or as a reflection of a different belief regarding human
behavior.
The consensus in the literature on utility theory is that Bernoulli meant to com-
pute the expected net change in utility and made a slight error. I have not been able
to find an example – other than [Menger(1934)] – where the slight difference be-
tween Bernoulli’s expression (Eq. 3) and the net change in logarithmic utility, (Eq. 4)
was not implicitly “corrected”. Already in [Laplace(1814)], p. 439–442, the expected
net change in utility is calculated, and the method is ascribed to Bernoulli(1738),
whereas (Eq. 3) is not mentioned. The book by [Todhunter(1865)] follows Laplace,
as do modern textbooks, which state in one form or another that utility is an object en-
coding human preferences in its expectation value, e.g. [Chernoff and Moses(1959),
Samuelson(1983)].
5 Summary and reception of Menger 1934
Sections 1–5 and 7 of [Menger(1934)] provide a review of earlier treatments of the
St. Petersburg paradox, Sections 2 and 10 clarifying comments regarding the nature
of the paradox, and Sections 8 and 9 a list of behavioral regularities with which
resolutions of the paradox should be consistent. In Section 5 Menger criticized D.
Bernoulli’s 1738 resolution on the grounds of its “ad hoc character”, referring to the
arbitrariness of the chosen utility function.
Menger’s main finding:
Menger’s paper is best known for the conclusions in its Sections 5 and 6 that only
bounded utility functions may be used if positively divergent expected net changes
in utility, irrespective of ticket price, are to be avoided in games similar to the St.
Petersburg lottery.
This conclusion will be shown to be incorrect. Apart from calling Bernoulli’s
solution “ad hoc” Menger avoids criticizing Bernoulli conceptually and focuses his
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efforts on a mathematical critique. As was shown in Section 4, it is indeed necessary
to look carefully at Bernoulli’s mathematical analysis, but Menger, instead of dis-
covering what was mathematically questionable in [Bernoulli(1738)], was misled by
precisely this questionable detail to his incorrect conclusion in his Section 6 that only
bounded utility functions are permissible.
5.1 Motivation for the present study
The requirement of boundedness specifically rules out logarithmic utility. It was
shown in Section 3, however, that logarithmic utility is mathematically equivalent
to the conceptually wholly different resolution based on ergodic theory. This point
of view provides a firm basis on which to erect a scientific formalism that does not
depend on psychological characteristics of human beings. It allows, for instance, to
define and compute optimal values of leverage for investments [Peters(2010)] and
precipitates a new notion of efficiency, which may be called “stochastic market effi-
ciency”, based on dynamic stability arguments. This type of efficiency has significant
predictive power and has been corroborated empirically [Peters and Adamou(2011)].
In this new context, [Menger(1934)] raises the question whether ergodic theory has
to be revised, Menger’s argument is invalid or, of course, [Peters(2010),Peters(2011),
Peters and Adamou(2011)] are incorrect. Close inspection shows that the slight inac-
curacy in D. Bernoulli’s 1738 computation of an expectation value propagated to the
extreme context of Menger’s work, where it turns into a significant error and indeed
invalidates Menger’s argument for the boundedness of utility functions. Menger fol-
lowed Bernoulli too closely but not carefully enough, copying the central computa-
tion unquestioningly but incompletely, whereas other researchers implictly corrected
Bernoulli e.g. [Laplace(1814)], p. 440, [Todhunter(1865)], p. 221.
5.2 Reception of Menger 1934
Menger’s detailed study [Menger(1934)] is widely cited and considered an important
milestone in the development of utility theory [Markowitz(1976),Samuelson(1977),
Arrow(2009)].
It is interesting that the weakness of Menger’s argument remained undiscovered
for at least 77 years (the argument was prepared in 1923, presented in 1927 and pub-
lished in 1934 [Menger(1934)]). Menger’s paper was criticized for its polemicism by
Samuelson: “I myself would be a bit more sparing in use of such phrases as ‘...he
will not, if he is sane...’ [Menger(1934)], p. 212; ‘...behavior of normal individu-
als...’ [Menger(1934)], p. 213; ‘...no normal person would risk his total fortune...’
[Menger(1934)], p. 217; ‘...behavior of normal people...’ [Menger(1934)], p. 222;
‘...it is clear that a normal man will risk only a limited part of his total wealth to
buy chances in games’ [Menger(1934)], p. 224” [Samuelson(1977)], p. 48–49. This
writing style makes it difficult to detect the flaws in Menger’s argument. Linguistic
clarity is lost where it is urgently needed – for instance, as we shall see below, the
word “risk” needs clarification, as do “sane” and “normal”.
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Credit is due to Arrow(1951) for writing clearly what we shall assume to be what
Menger had in mind (see Section 6.2). Menger’s implicit ruling-out of the fundamen-
tal ergodicity solution was perceived as “a drawback to the empirical implementation
of the expected-utility criterion, since many of the most convenient forms (e.g., the
logarithmic, the polynomials) seem inadmissable because of their unboundedness”
[Ryan(1974)], p. 133, and Arrow commented that Menger’s result “clearly meets
with a good deal of resistance”, [Arrow(1974)], p. 136. Nonetheless, also Arrow was
misled and wrote recently, comparing to Bernoulli(1738) “... a deeper understanding
was achieved only with Karl Menger’s paper (1934)”, [Arrow(2009)], p. 93.
Despite his stylistic criticism Samuelson had enough confidence in Menger’s
writing to conclude that “After 1738 nothing earthshaking was added to the findings
of Daniel Bernoulli and his contemporaries until the quantum jump in analysis pro-
vided by Karl Menger”, [Samuelson(1977)] p. 32, and further opined that “Menger
1934 is a modern classic that stands above all criticism”, p. 49. Several renowned
economists explicitly accepted Menger’s argument, as reflected in passages such as
“we would have to assume that U was bounded to avoid paradoxes such as those of
Bernoulli and Menger” [Markowitz(1976)], p. 1278, and to my knowledge no one
explicitly disagreed.
6 Errors in Menger’s 1934 paper
Menger’s error of conceptual type is the acceptance of an ensemble average as a
relevant criterion where only a single system exists. With this acceptance he follows
Bernoulli and inescapably brings the discussion to a behavioral level. D. Bernoulli
explicitly states that the expectation value has to be “discarded” but he does not do
so. His 1738 paper does not use the expectation value of the original gains in wealth
of N. Bernoulli’s work, but it still uses the expectation value of the utility of payouts
〈ln(DA)〉. The reader is referred to [Peters(2011)] for further details of the conceptual
problem. In the following we will focus on Menger’s technical errors.
6.1 The worst case in Menger’s game
On p. 217 Menger(1934) introduced a modified St. Petersburg game, game B, whose
payout for waiting time n is given by the function DB(n) =W exp(2n)−W . Menger
calls this a “slightly modified game”, presumably because, like the original game A,
it offers large payouts with small probabilities, and claims: “.. it is obvious that, even
in the modified Petersburg Game, no normal person would risk his total fortune or a
substantial amount”, p. 217–218.
The tone of this statement motivates further probing. In this section we clarify
what Menger means by the word “risk” in this sentence. We will thereby show that
he probably overlooked the following
Error 1:
The worst case a player can suffer is a waiting time of n = 1. But the payout in this
worst case is DB(n= 1) =W (exp(2)−1)≈ 6.3×W. In other words, in order to risk
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Table 1 The three different games used here are defined by their payout functions D(n), paid if in a
sequence of fair coin-tosses heads first occurs on the nth toss.
Introduced by Payout D(n) Label
N. Bernoulli 1713 2n−1 A
K. Menger 1934 W exp(2n)−W B
exp(2n) C
losing anything in the game, a player has to pay for a ticket more than 6.3 times his
wealth, presumably by borrowing.
Did Menger mean this by “risk”, i.e. did Menger mean that “no normal person
would” borrow as much as or more than $W × (exp(2)−2) to buy a ticket, whereas a
normal person may well borrow enough money to pay three times his “total fortune”?
It seems that he did not mean this, as we will see. It is most likely that Menger
overlooked the fact that the worst-case outcome in his game still poses no risk to the
person who pays $W for a ticket.
In the original game A there is little difference between “risking” and “paying as
a ticket price” because the difference between the worst-case net loss of $P−$1 (the
amount at risk), and the ticket price, $P, is only $1. In Menger’s game B, on the other
hand, the difference between the worst-case net loss, $P− $W (exp(2)− 1), and the
ticket price, $P, is $W (exp(2)−1), i.e. many times the individual’s wealth.
In his Section 2, on p. 212, Menger wrote, referring to the original game A: “If
B, who has an infinitely large expectation, would be willing to pay any amount of
money for the privilege of playing the game, then this behavior would conform to his
infinitely large mathematical expectation [...] Not only will B not pay an infinitely
high price to play the game, since this is impossible, buy he will not pay a very high
price that he could afford. In any case, he will not, if he is sane, risk all or even a
considerable portion of his wealth in a Petersburg game.”
This seems to indicate that if individuals were willing to pay the highest price they
can afford, Menger would have considered his paradox resolved. Assuming that the
highest price one can afford is one’s entire wealth (i.e. that borrowing is impossible),
Menger’s statement that “no normal person would risk his total fortune” would mean
that by “risk” he meant “pay as a ticket price” and that he thought no one would pay
his total fortune for a ticket in his game B. But since the worst-case outcome is a gain
greater than the total initial fortune, there is no reason not to pay one’s total fortune.
It seems that Menger did not notice by how much he changed the original game.
This particular problem can be fixed by considering a different game C, that
Menger did not propose, where the payout function is DC(n) = exp(2n). But the
more significant error, discussed in Section 6.2, remains. The three different games
involved in the discussion are summarized in Table 1.
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6.2 Menger overlooked a second divergence
This section establishes the main finding, Menger’s undiscovered mathematical error
mentioned in the introduction. In his attempt to show that logarithmic utility fails
to resolve the modified St. Petersburg game B, Menger showed on p. 217 that the
expected payout in logarithmic utility is infinite,
〈
∆U+B
〉
=
∞
∑
n=1
(
1
2
)n
ln
(
W +W exp(2n)−W
W
)
=
∞
∑
n=1
1. (5)
Menger continues with the statement: “it is obvious that, even in the modified Peters-
burg Game, no normal person would risk his total fortune or a substantial amount”
[Menger(1934)], p. 217–218.
It was pointed out in Section 6.1 that depending on the meaning of the word
“risk” this may be incorrect. The problem to be discussed now is that Menger does
not actually use Bernoulli’s criterion iii, (Eq. 3). Nor does he compute the expected
net gain in logarithmic utility, which equals the time average growth rate under the
dynamics discussed above, criterion ii (Eq. 2). He only considers the first term of
criterion iii, (Eq. 3).
It seems that Menger’s reasoning went as follows: The expected gain in utility at
zero ticket price is infinite, wherefore any loss in utility resulting from a finite ticket
price must be negligible. This reveals a linear way of thinking – it would be correct
if utility were linear (in which case the problems of criterion i would resurface).
Menger’s analysis amounts to the introduction of
Criterion iv:
a gamble is worth taking, irrespective of the ticket price, if the expected utility-payout,
(Eq. 5), is positive.
For instance, any real-life lottery, where a ticket is purchased and with a small
probability something is won, is recommended by this criterion. See Table 2 for all
criteria.
For clarity we turn to [Arrow(1951)], who summarized Menger as follows: “Let
U(x) be the utility derived from a given amount of money x, and suppose that U(x)
increases indefinitely as x increases [e.g. if U(x) = log(x), as in Bernoulli’s own
theory]. Then, for every integer n, there is an amount of money xn, such that U(xn) =
2n. Consider the modified St. Petersburg game in which the payment when a head
occurs for the first time on the nth toss is xn. Then, clearly, the expected utility will be
the same as the expected money payment in the original formulation and is therefore
infinite. Hence, the player would be willing to pay any finite amount of money for
the privilege of playing the game. This is rejected as contrary to intuition.”
Samuelson agrees: “...Menger shows one can always fabricate a Super-Petersburg
game [...] to make the compensation Paul needs again be infinite.” [Samuelson(1977)],
p. 32.
Both Arrow’s and Samuelson’s phrasings of Menger’s central result agree with
my reading of Menger’s statements. These statements are incorrect because of
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Table 2 The straw-man criterion i considers the expected net change in wealth. criterion ii considers
time-average growth rates which are mathematically identical to expected net changes in utility. It resolves
games A, B and C: there is a finite ticket price at which it discourages participation. While the utility inter-
pretation of criterion ii is purely behavioral and can only be judged by experiment, the time interpretation
allows predictions and judgments of when this resolution does not apply in reality. The assumption of
games played at an arbitrarily high frequency becomes crucial here and is not satistfied in real life. Cri-
terion iii is precisely D. Bernoulli’s resolution and implies the recommendation never to pay one’s entire
wealth for a ticket. Menger’s criterion iv shows that he only computed the first term of Bernoulli’s criterion
iii. Since criterion iv does not include the ticket price, it fails for all three games.
Introduced by Criterion Games resolved Label
Huygens 1657 〈D(n)〉−P︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected net wealth change
none i
Laplace 1814 〈ln(W +D(n)−P)〉− ln(W )︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected net utility change = time ave. growth rate
A, B, C ii
D. Bernoulli 1738 〈ln(W +D(n))〉− ln(W )︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected utility gain
− [ln(W )− ln(W −P)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility loss at purchase
A, B, C iii
Menger 1934 〈ln(W +D(n))〉− ln(W )︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected utility gain
none iv
Error 2:
Menger overlooked that the logarithm ln(W −P) diverges negatively at a finite value
of P.
If he did not overlook this divergence, then he overlooked Bernoulli’s second
term altogether. While it is correct that the first term of (Eq. 3) diverges positively,
making the game appear attractive, the second term diverges negatively as P→W .
Samuelson’s statement, paraphrasing Menger, is therefore incorrect, and Arrow’s is
correct only up to “Hence, the player would be willing...”
Menger’s game produces a case of competing infinities. For values P≥W , Bernoulli’s
criterion iii is not defined. We have to compare the divergences that lead to the in-
finities to understand what this undefined region signifies. To this end we consider
a finite lottery, identical to game B except that if heads does not occur in nmax coin
tosses, the game ends, and the lottery returns the ticket price1. For any finite value
nmax, the corresponding partial sum can be compensated for by a ticket price close
enough to the wealth of a person, so that criterion iii does not favor participation in
the lottery
∀nmax < ∞ ∃ P0 <W :
nmax
∑
n=1
(
1
2
)n
2n− ln
(
W
W −P0
)
= 0. (6)
To ensure that the criterion remains non-negative (recommending participation) up
to exactly P0 =W , events of zero probability must be taken into account. It is in this
1 Laplace introduced an nmax in game A, but chose to end the lottery and return nothing after nmax
successive tails events[Laplace(1814)], p. 440.
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Fig. 1 Mininum (integer) number of coin tosses, nmax, that need to be allowed in game B to render D.
Bernoulli’s criterion iii positive for a given price (red line), and the real number (green line) that renders
the criterion exactly zero. The limiting value is P0 =W , where an infinity of tosses is needed. Menger’s
game B is very profitable – even if P0 =W/2 and the number of coin tosses is limited to one, the cautious
criterion iii recommends playing.
sense that the region where (Eq. 3) is undefined corresponds to the recommendation
not to buy a ticket, and the diverging expectation value of the utility change resulting
from the payout is dominated by the negatively diverging utility change from the
purchase of the ticket.
The dominance of the divergence of the logarithm over the diverging sum can
be expressed mathematically in many different ways. For instance, (Eq. 6) can be
re-written as
nmax(P0) = ln
(
W
W −P0
)
, (7)
implying that the maximum allowed number of coin tosses, nmax, has to approach
infinity in order to counter-balance a price close to the finite value W , see Fig. 1.
Inverting (Eq. 7) yields P0(nmax) =W (1− exp(−nmax)): no matter how many terms,
or coin-tosses, are taken into account, the ticket price never has to be greater than W
to compensate for the diverging sum.
Far from suggesting recklessly risky behavior as criterion i does, Bernoulli’s cri-
terion iii can be criticized for being too cautious. As we have seen, the worst-case
outcome of Menger’s game (with nmax =∞) is a payout of some 630% of the player’s
initial wealth. At a ticket price of twice the player’s wealth, the worst-case net re-
sult is still an increase in wealth of 430%, but Bernoulli’s criterion iii discourages
participating.
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7 Menger’s game and ergodicity
In game B the difference between criterion ii and criterion iii becomes visible. While
Bernoulli’s criterion iii recommends buying a ticket as long as it is less expensive
than one’s total wealth (P < W ), criterion ii suggests to buy a ticket as long as it is
not possible to lose one’s entire wealth (P <W exp(2)).
Criterion ii is in this sense much riskier than Bernoulli’s, which raises the issue
of the relationship between mathematics and reality. Is it really advisable to pay for a
ticket $W exp(2)−$ε , where ε is an arbitrarily small number? With 50% probability
heads occurs on the first toss, and the player ends up penniless (except for $ε). Math-
ematical statements are correct in a sense that statements of other type are not. The
price we pay for the certainty inherent in mathematical statements is that they refer
to objects that don’t exist in an everyday sense of the word “exist”. It would be naı¨ve
to use any mathematical criterion as a guide for decisions without questioning the
criterion’s conceptual meaning and the axioms upon which its derivation rests. Ap-
plicability, or relevance to the real world, pertains only insofar as the axioms and their
consequences are a reflection of the real world. In the case of the expectation-value
criterion i, this ceases to be the case when fluctuations become significant and effects
of time, of events occuring in sequence, can no longer be ignored. The ergodicity res-
olution, criterion ii, assumes that equivalent lotteries can be played arbitrarily often,
and this breaks down in Menger’s game – games of his type are atypical in the real
world. If we come across such a game, it is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. Math-
ematics cannot offer much help in this situation. It makes sense of random events
only by embedding them in an ensemble of similar events, which may reside in par-
allel systems or within time. In the single-event setup, mathematics must shrug its
shoulders and admit defeat in the face of a moral decision.
There is nothing wrong with the mathematics in the ergodicity resolution [Peters(2011)].
If we are really offered Menger-type games to be played at an arbitrarily high fre-
quency, so that we can play arbitrarily often in our finite lives, then criterion ii will
be practically meaningful. It is important to note that the time average growth rate
(or expected net change in logarithmic utility) in game B does not fail to resolve
Menger’s paradox mathematically (unlike the expectation value in the original game
A). There is a finite price, P =W exp(2), from which criterion ii discourages playing
game B.
With payouts DC(n) = exp(2n) (game C) Bernoulli’s criterion iii recommends to
abstain from the gamble for ticket prices P ≥W . criterion ii recommends to abstain
if paying the ticket price poses the risk of bankruptcy, i.e. if P≥W +exp(2). Criteria
i and iv fail for game C in the sense that criterion i recommends paying any finite
price, though not necessarily an infinite price, and criterion iv recommends paying
even an infinite price.
8 Summary
In 1738 D. Bernoulli made an error, or approximation – insignificant in his context –
when he computed the expected net change in logarithmic utility. Perceiving this as an
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error, Laplace in 1814 and later researchers corrected it implicitly without mention. In
1934 Menger unwittingly re-introduced Bernoulli’s error and introduced a new error
by neglecting a diverging term. Throughout the twentieth century, Menger’s incorrect
conclusions were accepted by prominent economists such as Arrow, Samuelson and
Markowitz, although at least Arrow and Ryan noticed and struggled with detrimental
consequences of the (undetected) error for the developing foramlism. The equiva-
lence of logarithmic utility and time-averaging in the non-ergodic system allows a
physical interpretation. This provides a basis for the intuition that led to the discov-
ery of Menger’s error, as discussed above.
The discussion surrounding Menger’s 1934 paper deals with 3 different games,
defined by their payouts D(n), Table 1; and four different criteria to evaluate them,
Table 2.
Criterion i
As noted by N. Bernoulli, use of the expectation-value criterion i produces nonsensi-
cal recommendations in game A, which is true also for games B and C. It is important
to remember that there is no a priori reason for the expectation value to be a mean-
ingful quantity because it is conceptually based on an ensemble of systems, whereas
the paradox deals with only one system. The failure of criterion i is both mathemat-
ical (there is no finite price that should not be paid for a ticket) and conceptual (real
people do not behave this way).
Criterion ii
Criterion ii expresses the irreversibility of time and the non-ergodicity of the system,
and it can be phrased mathematically identically to the requirement of an expected
net increase in logarithmic utility. It resolves game A similarly to criterion iii. Games
B and C are mathematically resolved: no price P≥ D(n = 1)+W should be paid for
a ticket. Behaviorally, the situation is more complicated. The assumption of infinite
repeatability becomes important, and this is not usually realistic. Real people would
thus be ill-advised to take this criterion literally in games B and C. Since the criterion
is rooted in ergodic theory, or in the physical argument of time-irreversibility, it does
not suffer from the arbitrariness of criterion iii.
Criterion iii
Menger claimed that Bernoulli’s original criterion iii fails in the same sense in the
modified game B. But that is incorrect. Criterion iii fails neither mathematically (no
P≥W should be paid for a ticket) nor behaviorally (real people may well be limited
by a no-borrowing constraint, or unwilling to pay more than their wealths). The para-
dox with game C is analogously resolved. Criterion iii may be criticized for being
too strict – there is no fundamental reason not to pay more than $W if the minimum
payout $D(n = 1) > $W . It may also be criticized for being somewhat arbitrary –
why is a guaranteed return of 540% acceptable but not one of 520%?
Criterion iv
Menger’s criterion iv fails to resolve all games, even the original game A, because it
does not include the ticket price, which appears in the second term of criterion iii,
(Eq. 3). Irrespective of the ticket price, any gamble with a positive expected payout
(not net-payout) should be taken, and no gamble with a negative expected payout
should be taken (even if one were paid for participating). Menger was certainly un-
der the impression that he was using Bernoulli’s criterion iii, although it is unclear
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whether he was aware that this is different from criterion ii. By using criterion iv
Menger misrepresents Bernoulli, and his conclusions regarding both criteria ii and
iii are mathematically incorrect. His rejection of unbounded utility functions is math-
ematically unfounded, based on errors. This is important because different utility
functions can be shown to correspond to different types of dynamics. The logarithm
(an unbounded function) corresponds to exponential growth, one of the simplest dy-
namics and a good model for many natural processes.
Acknowledgements I thank M. Gell-Mann for helpful comments and discussions. ZONlab Ltd. is ac-
knowledged for support.
References
Arrow(1951). Arrow K (1951) Alternative approaches to the theory of choice in risk-taking situations.
Econometrica 19(4):404–437
Arrow(1974). Arrow K (1974) The use of unbounded utility functions in expected-utility maximization:
Response. Q J Econ 88(1):136–138
Arrow(2009). Arrow K (2009) A note on uncertainty and discounting in models of economic growth. J
Risk Uncertainty 38:87–94, DOI 10.1007/s11166-009-9065-1
Bernoulli(1738). Bernoulli D (1738) Specimen Theoriae Novae de Mensura Sortis. Translation “Exposi-
tion of a new theory on the measurement of risk” by L. Sommer (1954). Econometrica 22(1):23–36,
URL http://www.jstor.org/stable/1909829
Boltzmann(1871). Boltzmann L (1871) Einige allgemeine Sa¨tze u¨ber Wa¨rmegleichgewicht. Wiener
Berichte 63:679–711
Breiman(1961). Breiman L (1961) Optimal gambling systems for favorable games. In: Fourth Berkeley
Symposium, pp 65–78
Chernoff and Moses(1959). Chernoff H, Moses LE (1959) Elementary Decision Theory. John Wiley &
Sons
Cohen(1997). Cohen EGD (1997) Boltzmann and statistical mechanics. In: Boltzmann’s Legacy 150
Years After His Birth, Atti dei Convegni Lincei, vol 131, Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome,
pp 9–23, URL http://arXiv.org/abs/cond-mat/9608054v2
Gell-Mann and Tsallis(2004). Gell-Mann M, Tsallis C (eds) (2004) Nonextensive Entropy: Interdisci-
plinary Applications. Oxford University Press
Hanel et al(2011)Hanel, Thurner, and Gell-Mann. Hanel R, Thurner S, Gell-Mann M (2011) Generalized
entropies and the transformation group of superstatistics. Proc Nat Ac Sci 108(16):6390–6394
Huygens(1657). Huygens C (1657) De ratiociniis in ludo aleae. (On reckoning at Games of Chance). T.
Woodward, London
Kelly Jr.(1956). Kelly Jr JL (1956) A new interpretation of information rate. Bell Sys Tech J 35(4)
Laplace(1814). Laplace PS (1814) The´orie analytique des probabilite´s, 2nd edn. Paris, Ve. Courcier
Markowitz(1976). Markowitz HM (1976) Investment for the long run: New evidence for an old rule. J
Fin 31(5):1273–1286
Menger(1934). Menger K (1934) Das Unsicherheitsmoment in der Wertlehre. J Econ 5(4):459–485, DOI
10.1007/BF01311578, URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF01311578
Menger(1967). Menger K (1967) The role of uncertainty in economics. English translation by W. Schoel-
lkopf and W. G. Mellon. In: Shubik M (ed) Essays in mathematical economics in honor of Oskar
Morgenstern, Princeton University Press, chap 16, pp 211–231
Montmort(1713). Montmort PR (1713) Essay d’analyse sur les jeux de hazard, 2nd edn. Jacque Quillau,
Paris. Reprinted by the American Mathematical Society, 2006
Peters(2010). Peters O (2010) Optimal leverage from non-ergodicity. iFirst, Quant Fin DOI 10.1080/
14697688.2010.513338
Peters(2011). Peters O (2011) The time resolution of the St. Petersburg paradox. In press, Phil Trans R
Soc A, arXiv:10114404
Peters and Adamou(2011). Peters O, Adamou A (2011) Stochastic market efficiency. arXiv:11014548
16 Ole Peters
Ryan(1974). Ryan TM (1974) The use of unbounded utility functions in expected-utility maximization:
Comment. Quart J Econ 88(1):133–135
Samuelson(1977). Samuelson P (1977) St. Petersburg paradoxes: Defanged, dissected, and historically
described. J Econ Lit 15(1):24–55
Samuelson(1979). Samuelson PA (1979) Why we should not make mean log of wealth big though years
to act are long. J Banking Fin 3:305–307
Samuelson(1983). Samuelson PA (1983) Foundations of economic analysis, enlarged edn. Harvard Uni-
versity Press
Todhunter(1865). Todhunter I (1865) A history of the mathematical theory of probability. Macmillan &
Co.
